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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DOUGLAS C. STEPHENS, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
v. ) 
SHANNON DALE STEPHENS, ) 
) Case No. 880600-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. )District Court Case No. D86-3421 
ooOoo 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon this Court 
as appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2a-3. This is appeal from a portion of the final 
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, which awards Defendant all interest 
in her retirement plan and fails to make distribution of retire-
ment under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, thereby post-
poning the distribution of the benefits until they are received 
or until the Defendant is eligible to retire. Further, Defendant 
appeals from that portion of the Order which finds the value of 
-1-
the retirement to be $19,573.00 as of the date of trial in this 
matter. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by failing to 
enter an Order that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should 
be entered to award Plaintiff one-half of the value of 
Defendant's retirement plan on the date of entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, thereby providing for the distribution of the retirement 
funds when available under the pension plan? 
The remaining issues presented on appeal require 
consideration only if this Court finds that it was not an abuse 
of discretion by the Trial Court to fail to enter a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order for distribution of the Defendant's 
retirement plan when making division of the assets of the 
parties . 
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by finding the 
present value of Defendant's retirement plan to be the value as 
of September 30, 1987 and by failing to grant Defendant's Motion 
to Amend the Court's Ruling to value the pension plan as of the 
date of the most recent statement of value available, October 23, 
1987, or in the alternative to value the plan at its present 
market value on the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
December 24, 1987. 
-2-
STATUTES CONSIDERED 
The case considers application of The Retirement Equity 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1986) and speci-
fically Internal Revenue Code Section 414(p) relating to the 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order, a copy of which is attached 
as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on January 4, 1975. 
They separated in February, 1985, and each party filed an action 
for divorce, August 25, 1986. Appellant, Mrs. Stephens' original 
Complaint, District Court Civil Number D86-3434, was consolidated 
into this action and treated as a Counterclaim. (Record, Page 
16-17, 35-36). 
2. Trial was held in this matter beginning on November 
23, 1987, and continued thereafter until trial was concluded. 
The Court entered a bench ruling at the conclusion of trial on 
December 1, 1987. 
3. At trial Mr. Stephens introduced Exhibit P-40, which 
was a quarterly statement of the value of Mrs. Stephens' retire-
ment plan at the close of business on September 30, 1987. The 
value of the pension plan on that date, as shown by Exhibit P-40, 
was $19,573.00. (Exhibit P-40). 
4. The value of the pension plan at the time the parties 
separated was approximately $1,100.00. (Transcript of 
Proceedings, Page 168-169, Exhibit D-97). 
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5. Defendant's position at trial was that the pension 
should not be included as a part of the marital estate: However, 
if included in the marital estate, it should be divided by a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order because the funds are not 
distributable from the plan. (Transcript of Proceedings, Page 
102-104). 
6. Mrs. Stephens believed the value of her pension to 
be approximately $15,000.00 at the time of trial. (Transcript of 
Proceedings, Pages 102, 141, 152 and 169). 
7. Mrs. Stephens had requested documents from the plan 
administrator to show the current value, but the statement had 
not arrived at the time of trial and was not available. 
(Transcript of Proceedings, Page 152). 
8. Between the time of the statement of value of the 
plan at the end of the third quarter of 1987 was issued by the 
administrator and the date of trial there was a significant 
decline in the stock market during October 1987. (Judicial 
Notice). 
9. Much of Mrs. Stephens' retirement plan was invested 
by the administrator in a stock market portfolio. (Transcript of 
Proceedings, Page 169, Record Page 246). 
10. The Court entered its Bench Ruling on December 1, 
1987, finding the profit sharing plan to be a marital asset and 
awarding it in its entirety to the Defendant without assessing a 
value to the plan. 
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11. On December 10, 1987, the Defendant, Mrs. Stephens, 
filed a Motion to Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requesting the Court to Amend the 
Judgment made by ruling from the bench on December 1, 1987, 
requesting an order that the retirement benefits of the Defendant 
should be divided and the distribution of the assets should be 
postponed to be paid pursuant to the terms of the plan under a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order. The relief prayed for relied 
upon Bailey v. Bailey, Utah 70 Adv. Reports 20, (Court of 
Appeals, 11/13/87), an opinion which had been issued, but had not 
been published, at the time of trial in this matter. (Record 234 
through 236). 
12. Defendant also asked the Court in its Motion to 
Amend the Judgment from the bench of December 1, 1987, in the 
alternative, to establish a value of the plan as of the most 
current statement available, October 23, 1987, which Defendant 
had ordered two weeks prior to trial but did not receive until 
December 3, 1987. The Defendant was unable, with reasonable 
diligence, to discover and produce at trial a statement of value 
which was accurate as of the date this matter was tried. The 
most current statement of value available for the request made 
during the week of November 16, 1987, was the statement dated 
October 23, 1987. (Record 235). 
13. The Court entered its Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Amend the Judgment on December 29, 1987. (Record 263). 
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14. Each of the parties were granted a Decree of Divorce 
against the other dissolving the marriage on December 24, 1987. 
All other issues were reserved for the entry of further Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce. (Record Pages 261-262). 
15. On February 10, 1988, the Court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the final Decree of Divorce in 
this matter and found the value of the plan to be $9,573.00. 
(Record Pages 274-282, 294-304. Attached respectively as 
Exhibits "Ft" and "C") 
16. Paragraph 5 of the Decree (Transcript Page 278) 
awards the entire current value of the Pension to Mrs. Stephens 
although the asset is not readily available for distribution and 
awards Mr. Stephens other significant assets with liquidity and 
accessibility. 
17. The Court entered Findings of Fact generally 
referring to the property award and division without making a 
specific finding supporting the award of the Pension Plan to Mrs. 
Stephens. (Transcript, Pages 299, 301) 
18. The Court awarded Mr. Stephens $15,750.00 "of the 
proceeds of the sale (of the marital domicile) to equalize the 
marital estate . . . " before dividing the remaining equity bet-
ween the parties. (Transcript Page 279) 
19. On February 18, 1988, the Plaintiff filed a Motion 
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure asking 
-6-
for amendments to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce, which Motion was entitled Request for 
Additions to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce. (Record Pages 317-319). 
20. On July 26, 1988, Defendant filed a Motion pursuant 
to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the 
Decree of Divorce, which was entitled Motion to Conform Decree of 
Divorce to Agreement. (Record Pages 355-356). 
21. The Court entered an Order on August 17, 1988, 
resolving some of the issues presented by Plaintiff's Motion 
which was filed on February 18, 1988. (Record Pages 367-369). 
22. On September 19, 1988, the Court entered an Order 
Amending the Decree of Divorce and Judgment disposing of the 
remaining issues raised by Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion and all of 
the issues raised by Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment. (Record pages 392-398). 
23. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal in this matter on 
October 17, 1988. (Record Pages 432-433). 
24. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Disposition of 
the Appeal on November 10, 1988. This Court entered its Order 
that ruling on Plaintiff's Motion is deferred until plenary pre-
sentation and consideration of the case on December 15, 1988. 
-7-
SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
1. Equity requires that the Defendant's pension plan 
should be divided by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order which 
should be entered to become effective as of the date of the 
divorce in this matter, December 24, 1988, to award Plaintiff 
one-half of Defendant's retirement plan on that date as an alter-
nate payee. 
2. Equity requires that the division of a pension plan 
should always be made by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, 
when payment from that property is deferred, in order to treat 
each of the parties equitably when making distribution of the 
asset. 
3. If a Qualified Domestic Relations Order is not 
entered, then equity requires that the Court leave the record 
open to receive evidence of the fair market value of an invest-
ment pension plan and that the date of determination of value 
should be the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce, in this 
case, December 24, 1987. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
The award to Mrs. Stephens of her Pension Plan creates 
great inequity. On Mrs. Stephens1 side of the asset column, the 
Judge placed an asset which cannot be liquidated without severe 
penalty from the Internal Revenue Service and which was intended 
to be deferred to retirement. Liquidity is therefore limited and 
the plain practical advantage and usefulness of a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order ignored. The inequity is created by the 
award of $15,750.00 cash to Mr. Stephens to "equalize the mari-
tal estate". That cash award to Mr. Stephens in fact creates a 
great imbalance in favor of Mr. Stevens. 
Mr. Stephens is awarded a total of $30f250.00 cash while 
Mrs. Stephens is awarded essentially no liquid assets. The 
following analysis will show that the award to Mrs. Stephens of 
the Pension works a "manifest injustice" which is easily remedied 
by employing the Qualified Domestic Relations Order which awards 
each one-half of the pension plan and rearranging the other 
liquid asset awarded to allow for Mr. and Mrs. Stephens equally 
to share in the proceeds of the sale of the marital domicile. 
This rearrangement would produce a truly equal distribution 
which, from the language of the Decree, is the intent of the 
court. 
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I. 
EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE PENSION PLAN BE DISTRIBUTED 
PURSUANT TO A QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER. 
A. Standard for Review of Property Distributions. 
Addressing the general standard for division of marital property, 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a 
division of properties, it is a perrogative of the court 
to make whatever disposition of property as it deems 
fair, eguitable and necessary for the protection and 
welfare of the parties. [Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 
1080 (Utah 1977); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 
(Utah 1977); Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1977); Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978)] In 
the division of marital property, the trial judge has 
wide discretion, and his findings will not be disturbed 
unless the record indicates an abuse thereof." 
[Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980)] 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980). 
On review, a trial court's award of property will not be 
disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice or ineguity 
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. Turner v. Turner, 
649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). 
B. Standard for Awarding and Distributing a Pension 
Plan. Only recently have Utah Courts recognized the necessity of 
including pension plan and retirement funds when dividing and 
awarding assets in the marital estates. [Gardner v. Gardner, 73 
Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (1988); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 433 
(Utah 1982); Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830, 831-32 (Utah App. 
1987); Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 204-205 (Utah App. 
1987). 
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In Woodward v. Woodward, Supra, the issue before the 
Utah Supreme Court was whether the trial court had properly 
included the husband's government pension plan in the marital 
estate. Affirming the trial court's inclusion in the marital 
estate and award of one-half of the retirement benefits to hus-
band and wife, the Supreme Court held "If the rights to those 
benefits are acquired during the marriage, then the court must at 
least consider those benefits in making an equitable distribution 
of the marital assets" Woodward at P.432. 
However, once the decision is made to include a pension 
plan, additional practical considerations arise before the trial 
court. How to award and divide the pension plan asset becomes a 
major consideration in light of the following concern expressed 
by the Woodward court: 
"Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests 
are obviously too susceptible to continued strife and 
hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally 
strive to avoid to the greatest extent possible. This 
goal may be best accomplished, if a present value of the 
pension plan is assertainable, by fixing the other 
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all appropriate 
considerations, including the length of time the 
pensionor must survive to enjoy its benefits, to be 
satisfied out of other assets leaving all pension bene 
fits to the employee himself." [citing Kikkert v. 
Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (N.J. 1981)] Woodward, at 
p.433. 
Subsequent Utah Supreme Court cases have focused on the 
immediately preceeding language from Woodward as justifying 
awards of alternative assets where other sufficient assets exist 
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to justify equalization by the spouse who does not own or par-
ticipate in the pension plan. [Gardner v. Gardner, 73 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35, 36 (1988); Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 
1987). 
However, the Woodward case, was decided prior to the 
enactment of legislation which created the Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order which provides that a pension plan can be distri-
buted on a percentage basis by a court order naming an alter-
native payee who then becomes owner of that portion of the 
pension plan and need not have anything to do with the primary 
payee of the pension plan (Retirement Equity Act of 1984, PUB. L. 
No. 93-97, 98 Stat. 1426 (1986)). The Utah Court of Appeals has 
recognized the significant power of utilizing a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order in concert with the overriding con-
siderations for division given in Woodward, Supra. The signifi-
cant benefit to divorcing parties which is achieved by the 
employment of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order is final 
disentanglement of financial affairs while obtaining equitable 
distribution when intended i.e. upon retirement. In Marchant v. 
Marchant, the Plaintiff/husband was a federal employee with 
significant sums in his government pension plan. The 
Defendant/Wife had been awarded 1/3 of the value of the pension 
plan which the trial court decreed could be paid by the husband 
over a 10 year period. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
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court holding that the trial court erred when dividing the asset 
and should have applied the formula delineated in Woodward. 
Marchant, at P.205. 
The court stated: 
"The concurring opinions suggests that, to avoid 'long-
lasting financial entaglements' between the parties, 
defendant's retirement account should be valued and 
cashed out, if at all possible. Federal retirement, 
however, presents a different situation. Federal Law 
specifically indicates that a decree of divorce, which 
provides for a portion of retirement benefits to be paid 
to an ex-spouse, will be honored. It is necessary to 
conform to the requirements of 5 USC Section 8345 (1986) 
and regulations thereunder. Once the delineated proce-
dures have been followed, the monthly retirement payment 
is divided accordingly between retiree and ex-spouse by 
the office of personnel management and separate payments 
are made. There are no 'financial entaglements' between 
the couple." Marchant at P.205. 
The next occasion when the Court of Appeals recommended 
utilization of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order occurred in 
Bailey v. Bailey, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (1987). The 
Defendant/Spouse was employed as a school teacher and had accrued 
approximately $67,000.00 in his retirement fund. The parties had 
accumulated relatively few assets and the estate consisted of 
only the pension plan and the parties matrimonial domicile. The 
trial court awarded the pension monies to the husband and the 
residence to the wife. Mr. Bailey appealed the division claiming 
that the award to Mrs. Bailey was inequitable in that she 
received the only liquid asset while he received only a deferred 
asset (the retirement fund). 
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In Bailey, the Appellate Court reviewed the principals 
regarding distribution of a retirement fund stated in Woodward 
and reviewed the cases cited in Woodward and the principals enun-
ciated therein. The Court of Appeals then referred to Marchant 
v. Marchant, stating: 
"This court held the trial court errored in distributing 
retirement benefits at the time of the divorce rather 
than postponing distribution until the benefits are 
received. Arguably, Marchant is limited to federal 
retirement; yet the policy implications remain the same. 
Postponing distribution equalizes the risks and benefits 
to both parties. Not only is postponed distribution 
generally fairer, it also allows the asset to be used by 
both parties in a way and at a time the asset was 
intended to be used: for retirement." Bailey at P.21 
The Bailey court then recommended the general use of a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order as being the appropriate 
resolution for division of pension plans in line with the recom-
mendations stated in Woodward to avoid "financial entaglements". 
The court stated: 
"In Marchant, there were no direct financial entagle-
ments between the federal retiree and the ex-spouse. In 
review of recent federal legislation, the long term 
contract between divorced parties need only to be mini-
mal under any retirement program managed by a trustee. 
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 
98 Stat. 1426 (1986), created the Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order ('QDRO'). When a divorce is granted, 
the parties can obtain from the trial court a QDRO. The 
Order furnishes instructions to the trustee of a retire-
ment plan and specifies how distribution should be made, 
to whom, and when. Although a QDRO cannot order the 
payment of the benefit which is not allowed under a par-
ticular plan, it can order partial payment to an alter-
nate payee (an ex-spouse, for example). The Retirement 
Equity Act also simplifies the tax implications by pro-
viding that the person who actually receives the bene-
fits is liable for the taxes. (Citations omitted)" 
Bailey at P.21. 
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A review of the assets and liabilities awarded the par-
ties by the court reveals the inequality of the award to Mrs. 
Stephens. The net award to Mr. Stephens, obtained by subtracting 
liabilities from assets, is $39,147.00 while the net award to 
Mrs. Stephens is $41,009.00. However, Mr. Stephens is awarded 
$30,250.00 cash while Mrs. Stephens is awarded no cash. The only 
access Mrs. Stephens has to any cash would be to pre-maturely 
liquidate her pension plan for which she would suffer a penalty 
plus taking whatever sum was liquidated into account as ordinary 
income for income tax purposes. While the court sought to 
"equalize the award" by giving Mr. Stephens the first $15,750.00 
in cash after sale of the property, it created a significant ine-
quality by making that award. 
The court should have entered a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order awarding Mr. and Mrs. Stephens 50% each of the 
pension plan as of the date of the Decree of Divorce and then 
should have awarded each party 50% of the sale proceeds of the 
house. The net effect of entering a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order and awarding each party 50% of the sale proceeds would be 
that Mr. Stephens would receive net $23,397.00, plus one-half of 
the pension plan and one-half of the net proceeds of the sale and 
Mrs. Stephens would receive $21,436.00, plus one-half of the pen-
sion plan and one-half of the proceeds of sale. Fashioning the 
award in this manner would provide both parties with some cash 
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Reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held: 
"In summary, under our interpretation of Woodward, the 
distribution of retirement benefits should generally be 
postponed until benefits are received or at least until 
the earner is eligible to retire. This is particularly 
true where there is a sparcity of other divisible 
assets." Bailey at P.21. 
The clear underlying policy consideration in the line of 
cases beginning with Woodward and concluding with Bailey is to 
provide for a fair and equitable division of a pension plan 
through a Qualified Domestic Relations Order which allows income 
to be distributed at the time it was intended, disentagles the 
financial relationships of the divorcing parties, and does not 
unfairly penalize the pension plan beneficiary with an award of 
an illiquid asset. The case now before the court is a prime 
example of a situation where application of these principles 
should be employed to prevent a grossly inequitable result, as was 
pointed out by the Defendant in her Motion to Amend the Divorce 
Decree. 
C. Awarding Mrs. Stephens the Current Value of Her 
Pension Plan while Awarding Mr. Stephens other Liquid 
Counter-Balancing Marital Assets "Works a Manifest Inequity." 
Awarding Mrs. Stephens her pension plan while awarding Mr. 
Stephens cash to counter-balance that award fails to follow the 
guidelines for division of pension plan assets established by 
Woodward, Marchant and Bailey and creates a gross inequity to 
Mrs. Stephens. 
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after the sale of the house, and would meet the intent of the 
Woodward standard by postponing distribution of the pension plan 
until the time when it was originally intended for distribution, 
i.e. retirement. There are no further "financial entanglements" 
by making such a division. 
Another significant advantage to the Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order is obviating the need for providing testimony as 
to the value of a pension plan as of the date of Decree of 
Divorce. Where other assets are sufficient to meet the parties 
needs, the Qualified Domestic Relations Order avoids the ine-
quitable result which occurred in the case before the court, i.e. 
that the pension plan beneficiary was unable to obtain a current 
statement of value from the plan administrator and therefore the 
court awarded the value of the pension plan as of a date three 
months prior to the entry of decree. In this case, the result is 
that the value of the pension plan on the date of the decree, 
approximately $15,000.00, is $4,537.00 less than it was on the 
date of the last quarterly statement received by Mrs. Stephens. 
The inequitable result of the division of marital assets 
in this case could have been avoided by entry of the Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order. The Federal Legislation was enacted 
specifically for the purpose of avoiding the kind of inequity 
which has been created by the Order in this case, i.e. one party 
being required to resort to the pension plan asset for cash 
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needs, while the other party has significant amounts of cash at 
his disposal. The trial court failed to follow the standards set 
by this court in Woodward, Marchant and Bailey, resulting in 
severe inequity to Mrs. Stephens. This court should reverse the 
trial court award, and remand requiring entry of a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order directing equal division of the pension 
plan on December 24, 1987, and requiring an equal division of 
cash proceeds from sale of the home after payment of the 
encumbrances as directed by the court. 
II. 
VALUING THE PENSION PLAN TWO MONTHS 
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL IS CLEAR ERROR 
A. Standards for Review of Valuation of Marital Assets. 
The Utah Supreme Court has set standards regarding division of 
marital property which must be followed by trial courts. Marital 
property must be awarded and divided according to that property 
which exists as of the date of marital termination. Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 323 (Utah 1980). The valuation of mari-
tal assets will not be disturbed absence a clear abuse of discre-
tion. Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). However, 
determinations of the trial court will be altered on review where 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or there 
is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
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substantial and prejudicial error. English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409, 410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
B. The Record does not Support the Court's Valuation of 
the Pension Plan Resulting in Prejudicial Error. The court's 
valuation of Mrs. Stephens' pension plan at $19,537.00 is plain 
error. The court based its valuation upon a quarterly statement 
received from the pension plan administrator at the end of the 
third quarter of 1987, two months prior to trial (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit P-40). However, the value of the pension plan was 
drastically affected by the catastrophy befalling the stock 
market during October, 1987. Mrs. Stephens testified that the 
value of the pension plan at the time of trial was approximately 
$15,000.00 (Transcript, pp. 102, 141, 159 and 161). 
Finding the value of the pension plan to be $19,537.00 
as of the date of divorce is inconsistent with other findings of 
the trial court. The initial sentence in paragraph 8 of the 
Findings states: "The court finds that the assets and property 
acquired by the parties during the term of the marriage should be 
valued as of the time of the divorce." (Findings of Fact, 
Transcript p.298) Contrary to that determination, the court 
enters a value which is at least two months prior to the Decree 
of Divorce and is inconsistence with the real evidence. The pre-
judice to Mrs. Stephens is clear where the court awards to Mr. 
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Stephens the sum of $15,750.00 cash from the proceeds of the sale 
of the marital domicile "to equalize the marital estate" (Decree, 
paragraph 7, record P.279). 
CONCLUSION 
Awarding Mrs. Stephens the pension plan and valuing the 
same at $19,537.00 while awarding Mr. Stephens an additional 
$15,750.00 in cash worked a great inequity against Mrs. Stephens. 
The court should reverse the trial court, and direct entry of a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order which will direct the plan 
administrator to divide equally dividing and equally between the 
parties as of December 24, 1987 and equally dividing the proceeds 
of the sale of the house to be consistent with Woodward, Marchant 
and Bailey. 
DATED t h i s day of F e b r u a r y , 1989. 
LITTLEFIELD ,Sc-PETERSON 
:G W. PETERSON 
i t t o r / i e y s for 
D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
^ f ^ ^ 
33641-33644 
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(A) paragraphs (3), (4), (7), and (16) of section 
401(a), and 
(B) sections 408(k), 410, 411, 415, and 416. 
(4) Time when leased employee is first con-
sidered as employee.—In the case of any leased 
employee, paragraph (1) shall apply only for pur-
poses of determining whether the pension require-
ments listed in paragraph (3) are met for periods 
after the close of the 1-year period referred to in 
paragraph (2); except that years of service for 
the recipient shall be determined by taking into 
account the entire period for which the leased 
employee performed services for the recipient (or 
related persons). 
(5) Safe harbor.—This subsection shall not ap-
ply to any leased employee if such employee is 
covered by a plan which is maintained by the 
leasing organization if, with respect to such em-
ployee, such plan— 
(A) is a money purchase pension plan with a 
nonintegrated employer contribution rate of at 
least Th percent, and 
(B) provides for immediate participation and 
for full and immediate vesting. 
(6) Related persons.—For purposes of this 
subsection, the term "related persons" has the 
same meaning as when used in section 
103(bX6)(C). 
(o) Regulations.—The Secretary shall prescribe 
such regulations (which may provide rules in addi-
tion to the rules contained in subsections (m) and 
(n)) as may be necessary to prevent the avoidance of 
any employee benefit requirement listed in subsec-
tion (m)(4) or (n)(3) through the use of— 
(1) separate organizations, 
(2) employee leasing, or 
(3) other arrangements. 
(p) Qualified domestic relations order defined. 
—For purposes of this subsection and section 
401(a)(13>-
(1) In general.— 
(A) Qualified domestic relations order. 
—The term "qualified domestic relations order" 
means a domestic relations order— 
(i) which creates or recognizes the exist-
ence of an alternate payee's right to, or as-
signs to an alternate payee the right to, re-
ceive all or a portion of the benefits payable 
with respect to a participant under a plan, 
and 
(ii) with respect to which the requirements 
of paragraphs (2) and (3) are met 
(B) Domestic relations order.—The term 
"domestic relations order" means any judg-
ment, decree, or order (including approval of a 
property settlement agreement) which— 
(i) relates to the provision of child support, 
alimony payments, or marital property rights 
to a spouse, child, or other dependent of a 
participant, and 
(ii) is made pursuant to a State domestic 
relations law (including a community proper-
ty law). 
(2) Order must clearly specify certain facts. 
—A domestic relations order meets the require-
ments of this paragraph only if such order clearly 
specifies— -
(A) the name and the last known mailing 
address (if any) of the participant and the name 
and mailing address of each alternate payee 
covered by the order, 
(B) the amount or percentage of the partici-
pant's benefits to be paid by the plan to each 
such alternate payee, or the manner in which 
such amount or percentage is to be determined, 
(C) the number of payments or period to 
which such order applies, and 
(D) each plan to which such order applies. 
(3) Order may not alter amount, form, etc., of 
benefits.—A domestic relations order meets the 
requirements of this paragraph only if such or-
der— 
(A) does not require a plan to provide any 
type or form of benefit, or any option, not 
otherwise provided under the plan, 
(B) does not require the plan to provide in-
creased benefits, (determined on the basis of 
actuarial value), and 
(C) does not require the payment of benefits 
to an alternate payee which are required to be 
paid to another alternate payee under another 
order previously determined to be a qualified 
domestic relations order. 
(4) Exception for certain payments made af-
ter earliest retirement age.— 
(A) In general.—In the case of any payment 
before a participant has separated from service, 
a domestic relations order shall not be treated 
as failing to meet the requirements of subpara-
graph (A) of paragraph (3) solely because such 
order requires that payment of benefits be 
made to an alternate payee— 
(i) on or after the date on which the partic-
ipant attains (or would have attained) the 
earliest retirement age, 
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(ii) as if the participant had retired on the 
date on which such payment is to begin under 
such order (but taking into account only the 
present value of the benefits actually accrued 
and not taking into account the present value 
of any employer subsidy for early retire-
ment), and 
(iii) in any form in which such benefits 
may be paid under the plan to the participant 
(other than in the form of a joint and survivor 
annuity with respect to the alternate payee 
and his or her subsequent spouse). 
For purposes of clause (ii), the interest rate 
assumption used in determining the present 
value shall be the interest rate specified in the 
plan or, if no rate is specified, 5 percent 
(B) Earliest retirement age.—For purposes 
of this paragraph, the term "earliest retirement 
age" has the meaning given such term by sec-
tion 417(f)(3), except that in the case of any 
defined contribution plan, the earliest retire-
ment age shjall be the date which is 10 years 
before the normal retirement age (within the 
meaning of section 411(a)(8)). 
(5) Treatment of former spouse as surviving 
spouse for purposes of determining survivor 
benefits.—To the extent provided in any qualified 
domestic relations order— 
(A) the former spouse of a participant shall 
be treated as a surviving spouse of such partici-
pant for purposes of sections 401(aXH) and 417, 
and 
(B) if married for at least 1 year, the surviv-
ing spouse shall be treated as meeting the 
requirements of section 417(d). 
A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the 
requirements of subsection (a) or (k) of section 
401 which prohibit payment of benefits before 
termination of employment solely by reason of 
payments to an alternate payee pursuant to a 
qualified domestic relations order. 
(6) Plan procedures with respect to orders.— 
(A) Notice and determination by adminis-
trator.—In the case of any domestic relations 
order received by a plan— 
(i) the plan administrator shall promptly 
notify the participant and any other alternate 
payee of the receipt of such order and the 
plan's procedures for determining the quali-
fied status of domestic relations orders, and 
(ii) within a reasonable period after receipt 
of such order, the plan administrator shall 
determine whether such order is a qualified 
domestic relations order and notify the partic-
ipant and each alternate payee of such deter-
mination. 
(B) Plan to establish reasonable proce-
dures.—Each plan shall establish reasonable 
procedures to determine the qualified status of 
domestic relations orders and to administer dis-
tributions under such qualified orders. 
(7) Procedures for period during which deter-
mination is being made.— 
(A) In general.—During any period in which 
the issue of whether a domestic relations order 
is a qualified domestic relations order is being 
determined (by the plan administrator, by a 
court a competent jurisdiction, or otherwise), 
the plan administrator shall segregate in a sep-
arate account in the plan or in an escrow ac-
count the amounts which would have been pay-
able to the alternate payee during such period 
if the order had been determined to be a quali-
fied domestic relations order. 
(B) Payment to alternate payee if order de-
termined to be qualified domestic relations 
order.—If within 18 months the order (or modi-
fication thereof) is determined to be a qualified 
domestic relations order, the plan administrator 
shall pay the segregated amounts (plus any 
interest thereon) to the person or persons enti-
tled thereto. 
(C) Payment to plan participant in certain 
cases.—If within 18 months— 
(i) it is determined that the order is not a 
qualified domestic relations order, or 
(ii) the issue as to whether such order is a 
qualified domestic relations order is not re-
solved, 
then the plan administrator shall pay the segre-
gated amounts (plus any interest thereon) to 
the person or persons who would have been 
entitled to such amounts if there had been no 
order. 
(P) Subsequent determination or order to 
be applied prospectively only.—Any determi-
nation that an order is a qualified domestic 
relations order which is made after the close of 
the 18-month period shall be applied prospec-
tively only. 
(8) Alternate payee defined.—The term "altera 
nate payee" means any spouse, former spouse, 
child or other dependent of a participant who is 
recognized by a domestic relations order as hav-
ing a right to receive all, or a portion of, the 
benefits payable under a plan with respect to 
such participant. 
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(9) Consultation with the secretary.—In pre-
scribing regulations under this subsection and 
section 401(aX13), the Secretary of Labor shall 
consult with the Secretary. 
(Added Pub.L. 93-406, Title II, § 1015, Sept 2, 1974, 88 
Stat 925, and amended Pub.L 94-455, Title XIX, 
§§ 1901(aX64), 1906(bX13XA), Oct 4, 1976, 90 Stat 1775, 
1834; Pub.L 95-600, Title I, § 152(d), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 
Stat 2799; Pub.L 96-364, Title II, §§ 207, 208(a), Title IV, 
§ 407(b), 94 Stat 1288,1289,1305; Pub.L. 96-605, Title II, 
§ 201(a), Dec. 28, 1980, 94 Stat 3526, PubL. 96-613, 
§ 5(a), Dec. 28,1980, 94 Stat 3580; Pub.L 97-248, Title II, 
§§ 240(c), 246(a), 248(a), Sept 3, 1982, 96 Stat 520, 525, 
526, Pub L 98-369, Title IV, § 491(d)(26), (27), Title V, 
§ 526(aXlXbXD, (dXl), (2), Title VII, § 713(i), July 18,1984, 
98 Stat 850, 874, 875, 960; Pub.L. 98-397, Title II, 
§ 2041(b), Aug. 23, 1984, 98 Stat 1445.) 
l See Codification notes set out below 
Editorial Notes 
Codification. Par (5) of subsec (m), relating to definitions, and par 
(6) of subsec (m), relating to regulations, were redesignated as pars (6) 
and (7), respectively, by Pub L 97-248, Title II, § 246(a), Sept 3, 1982, 
96 Stat 525, effective after Dec 31, 1983 
Section 526(dX2) and (3) of Pub L 98-369 purported to repeal par 
(6) of subsec (m) effective on July 18, 1984 This repeal was not 
executed to par (6) as redesignated from par (5) in that the probable 
intent of Congress was to repeal par (7) as redesignated from par (6) 
Since section 526(dXO of PubL 98-369 added a new subsec (o) 
relating to regulations, it appears that par (7), relating to regulations, as 
redesignated from par (6), was the paragraph intended to be repealed 
Both Pub L 96-605 and Pub L 96-613 provided for the addition of 
subsec (m) of this section PubL 96-605, § 201(c), and PubL 
96-613, § 5(c), provided, in identical language, that the subsec (m) of 
this section thus added is applicable to plan years ending after Nov 30, 
1980, with an added provision that, in the case of a plan in existence on 
Nov 30, 1980, the subsec (m) thus added shall apply to plan years 
beginning after Nov 30, 1980 
References in Text Railroad Retirement Act of 1935 or 1937, 
referred to in subsec (d), is classified to 45 U S C A § 228 et seq 
International Organizations Immunities Act, referred to in subsec (d), 
is classified to 22 U S C A § 288 et seq 
The Employee Retirement Income Secunty Act of 1974, referred to in 
subsecs. (f)(3), (5) and (/), is Pub L 93-406, Sept 2, 1974, 88 Stat 832, 
as amended Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Secunty Act 
of 1974 is classified to section 1301 et seq of U S C A Title 29, Labor 
Section 3(37XAKiu) of the Employee Retirement Income Secunty Act of 
1974 is classified to section 1002(37XAXm) of U S C A Title 29 
Section 4403(b) and (c) of the Employee Retirement Income Secunty 
Act of 1974 probably means section 4303(b) and (c) of such Act which 
is classified to section 1453(b) and (c) of U S C A Title 29 
The date of the enactment of the Multiemployer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act of 1980, referred to in subsec (fX4) and (5), means 
the date of the enactment of Pub L. 96-364, which was approved Sept 
26, 1980 
Effective date of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 
1980, referred to in subsec (0(5), probably means the date of enactment 
of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, which 
was approved Sept 26, 1980 
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment Amendment by Pub L. 98-397, 
applicable to plan years beginning after December 31, 1984, except as 
otherwise provided in sections 302(b), (c), (d) and 303 of Pub.L. 98-397, 
pursuant to section 302(a) of Pub L. 98-397 
Amendment by section 491(d)(26)f (27) of Pub L. 98-369 applicable 
to obligations issued after Dec 31, 1983, pursuant to section 491(0(1) of 
PubL. 98-369 
Section 526(bX2) of Pub L. 98-369 provided that "The amendment 
made by this subsection [amending subsec (nX2) of this section] shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983 " 
Section 526(dX3) of Pub L. 98-369 provided that "The amendments 
made by this subsection [enacting subsec (o) of this section and 
repealing subsec (mX6) of this title] shall take effect on the date of the 
enactment of this Act [July 18, 1984]" 
Amendment by section 713(i) of Pub L. 98-369, except where other-
wise provided, effective as if included in provision of Pub L. 97-248, The 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, to which the amend-
ment relates, pursuant to section 715 of Pub L. 98-369 
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment Amendment by section 240(c) of 
PubL. 97-248 applicable to years beginning after Dec 31, 1983, 
pursuant to section 241(a) of Pub L. 97-248 
Section 246(b) of Pub L. 97-248 provided that "The amendments 
made by subsection (a) [amending subsec (m) of this section] shall apply 
to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983 " 
Section 248(b) of Pub L. 97-248 provided that "The amendment 
made by subsection (a) [enacting subsec (n)J shall apply to taxable 
years beginning after December 31, 1983 " 
Effective Date of 1980 Amendments. Section 201(c) of Pub L 96-
605 and section 5(c) of Pub L 96-613 provided that 
"(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amend-
ments made by this section [amending this section and sections 105 and 
125 of this title] shall apply to plan years ending after November 30, 
1980 
"(2) Plans in existence on November 30,1980.—In the case of a plan 
in existence on November 30, 1980, the amendments made by this 
section [amending this section and sections 105 and 125 of this title] 
shall apply to plan years beginning after November 30, 1980" 
Section 407(c) of Pub L. 96-364 provided that "The amendments 
made by this section [amending subsec (e) of this section and section 
1002(33) of Title 29, Labor] shall be effective as of January 1, 1974 " 
Amendment of subsecs (0 and (/) by Pub L 96-364 effective, except 
as specifically provided, Sept 26, 1980, pursuant to section 210 of 
Pub L. 96-364 
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment Amendment of subsecs. (b), (c) 
of this section by section 152(d) of Pub L 95-600 applicable to taxable 
years beginning after Dec 31, 1978, pursuant to section 152(h) of Pub L. 
95-600 
§ 4 1 5 * limitations on benefits and contribu-
tion under qualified plans 
(a) General rule.— 
(1) Trusts.—A trust which is a part of a pen-
sion, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan shall not 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD VUUlClkL fat^l&CTT 
T^uiy Usr* 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS C. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHANNON DALE STEPHENS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. D-86-3421 
The above matter came before the Court for trial on Monday, 
the 23rd day of November, 1987, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., and 
continuing thereafter until concluded, the Honorable Scott 
Daniels, Judge presiding. The plaintiff was present in person 
and represented by counsel, Ellen Maycock. The defendant was 
present in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson. 
The Court having received the testimony of the witnesses 
presented, having reviewed the exhibits received into evidence, 
having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received the 
arguments of counsel, and now being well advised in the premises, 
does enter its Findings of Fact, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties herein were bona fide residents of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three months 
immediately preceding the filing of this action for divorce. 
2. During the term of the marriage, the parties commenced 
to argue continuously such that they separated in February, 1985, 
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and have lived separate and apart since that date, they are no 
longer in love with each other and cannot remain married to each 
other. 
3. During the marriage, there have been two children born 
as issue, to wit: McKinley Stephens, and McCall Stephens, 
4. At the conclusion of trial on November 23, 1987, the 
parties entered into an agreement regarding the issues of custody 
and visitation which was received by the Court. The parties 
agreed that the defendant will be awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of the minor children of the parties, subject 
to parental rights and visitation being reserved in the 
plaintiff, as follows: 
(a) Plaintiff shall have the right of visitation every 
other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.; 
every Thursday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; and one additional 
day every other week from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., with plaintiff 
to pick up the children from day care on those weekdays. 
(b) Every other holiday on New Year's Day, President's 
Day, Martin Luther King's birthday, Memorial Day, Independence 
Day, Pioneer Day and Labor Day. 
(c) Father's Day each year. 
(d) In every odd-numbered year, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled to exercise visitation for the Thanksgiving holidays 
from Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m., and for 
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Easter or spring vacation from 6:00 p.m. on the day preceding the 
commencement of the holiday to 6:00 p.m. on the day preceding the 
children's return to school. 
(e) Plaintiff shall be entitled to visitation on 
Christmas Day from 12:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The plaintiff shall 
also have visitation for one-half of the Christmas holidays which 
will be December 26th at 9:00 a.m. through December 29th at 6:00 
p.m., or December 30th at 9:00 a.m. through January 2nd at 6:00 
p.m. (unless January 2nd is a school day, in which event the 
visitation shall conclude on January 1st at 6:00 p.m.) In the 
years in which plaintiff has visitation beginning December 26thf 
the children shall remain with him for Christmas Day through his 
visitation period. The holiday visitation shall be divided 
between the parties so that each of them will exercise the latter 
half of the holiday visitation to coincide with their exercise of 
the New Year's Day holiday with the children. 
(f) Plaintiff shall be entitled to exercise extended 
visitation with the children for two weeks on two occasions 
during the children's summer vacation from school. 
(g) When the children are out of school for recess at 
times other than those already specifically mentioned (i.e., UEA 
break, deer hunt), plaintiff shall have preference over day care 
for care of the children during the day time for such school 
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recess if the defendant plans on using day care during those 
times. 
(h) When defendant travels the plaintiff shall have 
the option to be first alternative to care for the children 
during such travel by the defendant. Defendant will make 
reasonable efforts to provide reasonable notice to plaintiff of 
her travel plans. 
(i) Defendant shall make provision for the plaintiff 
to participate in elective medical decisions for the benefit of 
the children. Plaintifffs attendance at school programs and 
parent/teacher conferences and his participation or attendance at 
the children•s social activities, i.e., dance recitals, sports 
activities. 
(j) Each of the parties shall be enjoined from saying 
anything to anyone to undermine the authority of the other parent 
over the children. 
5. The Court finds that the amount of $225.00 per child 
per month is a fair figure for half of the costs of raising the 
minor children at this level and standard of living. This 
finding is not based on the fact that one party can afford the 
cost of supporting the children more than the other party, but 
based on the finding that the fair cost of raising a child at 
this standard of living is $450.00 per month per child. Further, 
the Court finds that each of the parties should be awarded the 
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right to claim one of the children as an exemption for purposes 
of federal and state income tax reporting and that after one of 
the children reaches the age of majority, then the remaining 
exemption should be alternated between them annually. 
6. Health and dental insurance will continue to be 
provided by the defendant through her place of employment for the 
benefit of the minor children for so long as it is available. If 
health and dental insurance should become unavailable to the 
defendant
 f then the parties will equally divide the cost of 
keeping the children insured on a policy of health and dental 
insurance. The parties will each be required to pay one-half of 
the medical and dental costs which are not covered by insurance. 
7. Each of the parties are able to support themselves, and 
an award of alimony is not required in this matter. 
8. The Court finds that the assets and property acquired 
by the parties during the term of the marriage should be valued 
as of the time of divorce. In making a division and valuation, 
the Court has taken into consideration the fact that there are 
substantial properties and the changing values of the property 
during the course of litigation from the time of separation until 
the time of trial in this matter; further taking into 
consideration the fact that plaintiff has sold some of the 
assets, including an automobile and some paintings, that the 
defendant received a tax refund, a portion of which should have 
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been plaintiff's, and that defendant spent the tax refund money; 
and considering that the defendant should owe a little bit more 
in support, the Court does find that the marital estate consists 
of assets and liabilities which should be awarded to each of the 
parties or ordered to be paid by each of them based upon values, 
as follows: 
ASSETS 
Plaintiff Item 
Linden Avenue 
Maple Hills 
Reeves Terrace No. 1 
Reeves Terrace No. 2 
Iron Blossom Lodge 
Park City 
Household furnishings 
1986 Isuzu 
1982 Volkswagen 
Sailboat 
Jet Ski 
Trailer 
Snowplow 
Pension 
Tax refunds (1985 & 1986) 
BMW sale 
Toyota sale 
Cash in escrow 
Cash to plaintiff 
$45,000.00 
21,500.00 
15,000.00 
3,000.00 
52,000.00 
10,671.00 
10,175.00 
Defendant 
$45,000.00 
11,225.00 
-0-
1,600.00 
1,400.00 
19,573.00 
-0-
14,500.00 
15,750.00 
Item 
LIABILITIES 
Plaintiff Defendant 
Richard E. Stephens $ 8,000.00 
CFS (Linden first mortgage) 32,455.00 
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Item Plaintiff Defendant 
Mays (Linden second mortgage) 4,064.00 
Utah State Credit Union 21,175.00 
(Reeves No. 1) 
N. Solomon (Maple Hills first) $34,348.00 
Utah State Credit Union (Isuzu) 7f790.00 
E. Reynolds (Park City) 48f881.00 
LSI Trust (Reeves Terrace #2) 14,947.00 
R.E. Stephens 860.00 
J. Miller (Volkswagen) 2,000.00 
N. Solomon (cash to plaintiff) 3,000.00 
Cottonwood Security Bank 1,769.00 
(plaintiff's overdraft) 
Cottonwood Security Bank 1,441.00 
(defendant•s overdraft) 
Credit cards (plaintiff's 1,964.00 
personal charges) 
Property taxes 3,544.00 
9. Based on the foregoing division of assets and 
liabilities, the Court finds that the defendant has received a 
considerable amount more of the assets of the marital estate. 
The Court finds that the marital residence on Gundersen Lane 
should be sold, with the area rugs to be included in the sale and 
the proceeds should be used to equalize the division of the 
marital estate. After payment of the first mortgage, the equity 
will be paid first for the expenses of sale, including any 
expenses of the defendant to make the house ready for sale, plus 
real estate fees and all closing costs. Second, defendant will 
be reimbursed for counseling fees in the amount of $300.00. 
Then, the outstanding liability owed to Joe and Wanda May for a 
promissory note signed by the defendant shall be paid. Until 
such time as the Mays are paid, the parties should be required to 
STEPHENS V, STEPHENS PAGE EIGHT FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
execute a trust deed on the Gundersen Lane property as security 
for that outstanding debt. Following payment to the Mays, the 
plaintiff shall then receive the first $15,750.00 of the proceeds 
of the sale to equalize the marital estate and any balance 
remaining thereafter will be divided equally between the parties. 
10. The Court finds that until the Gundersen Lane property 
is sold, it should continue to be used by the defendant as her 
residence and she will make all payments, pay all utilities and 
receive the rents from said property. The defendant will be 
responsible for the sale of the property, both listing it and 
selling it. The defendant may sell the property at any price 
that she finds reasonable; however, the plaintiff should have the 
right of first refusal in the event defendant attempts to sell 
the home for too low a price, plaintiff will then have an 
opportunity to buy it at the price for which defendant intends to 
sell it. 
11. The Court finds that the division of the assets should 
not be made only by specific dollar amount, but based upon what 
the Court considers equitable in the circumstances. The Court 
has paid attention to the value of the assets in making its 
division, but has not necessarily made the determination for the 
distribution of assets based upon what the parties presented as 
value. The Court, in making its consideration, has determined 
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that the defendant should be awarded the present cash value of 
her retirement plan, 
12. The furniture, furnishings and fixtures and other 
personal property should be awarded to each of the parties as 
they have divided it, except that the rosewood hutch should be 
delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff, and the desk and 
credenza should be delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant. 
The defendant will also receive the needlepoint seat which she 
made, but the plaintiff will be entitled to retain the rocker. 
The defendant should receive the walnut frames. The roll-top 
desk should be sold immediately and the proceeds from the sale 
divided equally between the parties. Duplicates should be made 
of the slides and photographs in possession of each of the 
parties, and each of them should be ordered to divide equally the 
cost of preparing the duplicates. 
13. The parties should share equally in any recovery from 
the Larsen Judgment, and each of them should be directed to pay 
one-half of the attorney's fees incurred for obtaining and/or 
collecting the Judgment. 
14. The defendant should be awarded Judgment for past due 
child support in the amount of $450.00 through November 30, 1987. 
15. Each of the parties have the ability to pay their own 
costs and attorney's fees which they have incurred in this 
matter, except that the Court finds that the necessity of having 
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two hearings on the issue of plaintiff's transfer of title to the 
Maple Hills property was not necessary, and the defendant should 
be directed to pay $350.00 for the benefit of plaintifffs 
attorney's fees. The payment of said $350.00 attorney's fees 
should be made from the distribution of the proceeds of the sale 
to plaintiff prior to dividing the shares between the parties. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Factf this Court does 
enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law, as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court does have jurisdiction to enter a Decree of 
Divorce in this matter. 
2. A Decree of Divorce should be awarded to each of the 
parties mutually upon the grounds that they have each treated the 
other cruelly, causing great mental distress, and making 
continuation of the marriage relationship impossible. 
3. The defendant should be awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of the minor children of the parties, subject 
to the reservation of certain parental rights and visitation 
being reserved in the plaintiff as agreed upon by the parties. 
4. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the defendant 
the sum of $225.00 per month per child as child support for the 
benefit of the minor children of the parties. 
5. The defendant should be ordered to maintain health and 
dental insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the 
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parties so long as it is available through her place of 
employment* In the event health and dental insurance should no 
longer be available through defendant's place of employment, each 
of the parties should be directed to pay one-half of any costs of 
health and dental insurance. Each of the parties should be 
ordered to pay one-half of any and all costs for health and 
dental care which are not paid for by insurance benefits. 
6. A permanent injunction should enter enjoining each of 
the parties from undermining the authority of the other regarding 
the children's behavior, from involving the children in their 
disputes, and making the preliminary injunction heretofore issued 
In this matter a permanent injunction. 
7. There should be no award of alimony in this matter. 
8. An order should be entered making division of the 
Marital estate and making provision for the payment of 
^rtstanding liability based upon the Findings of Fact heretofore 
Entered in this matter. 
Dated this J day of February, 1988. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H rvv.*'*^ ^ ..jur*' cry 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage 
prepaid, to the following, this /D dav of February, 1988: 
Ellen M. Maycock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 S. Main Street #620 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Craig M. Peterson 
Attorney for Defendant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
fXtAtO i&,i<P£ 
EXHIBIT "C" 
FILED JMCU-RK'S OFFICE 
S-:rL::y.'. County ••Jtafc 
FEB 10 1368 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT^ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS C. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHANNON DALE STEPHENS, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
CIVIL NO. D-86-3421 
The above matter came before the Court for trial on Monday, 
the 23rd day of November, 1987, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., and 
continuing thereafter until concluded, the Honorable Scott 
Daniels, Judge presiding. The plaintiff was present in person 
and represented by counsel, Ellen Maycock. The defendant was 
present in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson. 
The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in this matter does now enter its Decree of 
Divorce, as follows: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Each of the parties are granted a Decree of Divorce 
against the other dissolving the marriage entered into between 
them. 
2. The defendant is awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the minor children, McKinley Stephens and McCall 
Stephens, subject to certain parental rights and visitation being 
reserved in the plaintiff, as follows: 
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(a) Plaintiff shall have the right of visitation every 
other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.; 
every Thursday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; and one additional 
day every other week from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., with plaintiff 
to pick up the children from day care on those weekdays. 
(b) Every other holiday on New Year's Day, President's 
Day, Martin Luther King's birthday, Memorial Day, Independence 
Day, Pioneer Day and Labor Day. 
(c) Father's Day each year. 
(d) In every odd-numbered year, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled to exercise visitation for the Thanksgiving holidays 
from Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m., and for 
Easter or spring vacation from 6:00 p.m. on the day preceding the 
commencement of the holiday to 6:00 p.m. on the day preceding the 
children's return to school. 
(e) Plaintiff shall be entitled to visitation on 
Christmas Day from 12:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The plaintiff shall 
also have visitation for one-half of the Christmas holidays which 
will be December 26th at 9:00 a.m. through December 29th at 6:00 
p.m., or December 30th at 9:00 a.m. through January 2nd at 6:00 
p.m. (unless January 2nd is a school day, in which event the 
visitation shall conclude on January 1st at 6:00 p.m.) In the 
years in which plaintiff has visitation beginning December 26th, 
the children shall remain with him from Christmas Day through the 
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visitation period. The holiday visitation shall be divided 
between the parties so that each of them will exercise the latter 
half of the holiday visitation to coincide with their exercise of 
the New Year's Day holiday with the children. 
(f) Plaintiff shall be entitled to exercise extended 
visitation with the children for two weeks on two occasions 
during the children's summer vacation from school. 
(g) When the children are out of school for recess at 
times other than those already specifically mentioned (i.e., UEA 
break, deer hunt), plaintiff shall have preference over day care 
for care of the children during the day time for such school 
recess if the defendant plans on using day care during those 
times. 
(h) When defendant travels the plaintiff shall have 
the option to be first alternative to care for the children 
during such travel by the defendant. Defendant will make 
reasonable efforts to provide reasonable notice to plaintiff of 
her travel plans. 
(i) Defendant shall make provision for the plaintiff 
to participate in elective medical decisions for the benefit of 
the children. Plaintiff's attendance at school programs and 
parent/teacher conferences and his participation or attendance at 
the children's social activities, i.e., dance recitals, sports 
activities. 
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(j) Each of the parties shall be enjoined from saying 
anything to anyone to undermine the authority of the other parent 
over the children. 
3. The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of 
$225.00 per month per child as child support for the benefit of 
the minor children of the parties. Each of the parties shall 
have the right to claim one of the children as an exemption for 
income tax purposes. When one of the children reaches the age of 
majority, the parties shall claim the remaining child in 
alternate years. 
4. The plaintiff is ordered to maintain health and dental 
insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the parties so 
long as it is available through her place of employment. In the 
event health and dental insurance should no longer be available 
through plaintiff's place of employment, each of the parties 
shall pay one-half of any costs of health and dental insurance. 
Each of the parties are ordered to pay one-half of any and all 
costs for health and dental care which are not paid for by 
insurance benefits. 
5. There shall be no award of alimony in this matter. 
6. An order shall be entered making division of the 
marital estate as follows: 
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ASSETS 
Item 
Linden Avenue 
Maple Hills 
Reeves Terrace No. 1 
Reeves Terrace No. 2 
Iron Blossom Lodge 
Park City 
Household furnishings 
1986 Isuzu 
1982 Volkswagen 
Sailboat 
Jet Ski 
Trailer 
Snowplow 
Pension 
Tax refunds (1985 & 1986) 
BMW sale 
Toyota sale 
Cash in escrow 
Cash to plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
$45,000.00 
21,500.00 
15,000.00 
3,000.00 
52,000.00 
10,671.00 
10,175.00 
Defendant 
$45,000.00 
11,225.00 
-0-
1,600.00 
1,400.00 
19,573.00 
-0-
14,500.00 
15,750.00 
LIABILITIES 
Item 
Richard E. Stephens 
CFS (Linden first mortgage) 
Mays (Linden second mortgage) 
Utah State Credit Union 
(Reeves No. 1) 
N. Solomon (Maple Hills first) 
Utah State Credit Union (Isuzu) 
E. Reynolds (Park City) 
LSI Trust (Reeves Terrace #2) 
R.E. Stephens 
J. Miller (Volkswagen) 
N. Solomon (cash to plaintiff) 
Cottonwood Security Bank 
(plaintiff's overdraft) 
Plaintiff 
$ 8,000.00 
32,455.00 
4,064.00 
21,175.00 
7,790.00 
48,881.00 
14,947.00 
860.00 
3,000.00 
1,769.00 
Defendant 
$34,348.00 
2,000.00 
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Item Plaintiff Defendant 
Cottonwood Security Bank 1,441.00 
(defendant•s overdraft) 
Credit cards (plaintiff's 1,964.00 
personal charges) 
Property taxes 3,544.00 
7. The marital residence on Gundersen Lane shall be sold, 
with the area rugs to be included in the sale and the proceeds 
shall be used to equalize the division of the marital estate. 
After payment of the first mortgage, the equity will be paid 
first for the expenses of sale, including any expenses of the 
defendant to make the house ready for sale, plus real estate fees 
and all closing costs. Second, defendant shall be reimbursed for 
counseling fees in the amount of $300.00. Then, the outstanding 
liability owed to Joe and Wanda May for a promissory note signed 
by the defendant shall be paid. Until such time as the Mays are 
paid, the parties shall be required to execute a trust deed on 
the Gundersen Lane property as security for that outstanding 
debt. Following payment to the Mays, the plaintiff shall then 
receive the first $15,750.00 of the proceeds of the sale to 
equalize the marital estate and any balance remaining thereafter 
will be divided equally between the parties. 
8. Until the Gundersen Lane property is sold, it should 
continue to be used by the defendant as her residence and she 
shall make all payments, pay all utilities and receive the rents 
from said property. The defendant shall be responsible for the 
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sale of the property, both listing it and selling it. The 
defendant may sell the property at any price that she finds 
reasonable; however, the plaintiff shall have the right of first 
refusal prior to sale. Defendant shall give notice to plaintiff 
of the terms of the sale, and plaintiff shall then have an 
opportunity to buy it at the price for which defendant intends to 
sell it. 
9. Defendant shall be awarded the present cash value of 
her retirement plan. 
10. The furniture, furnishings and fixtures and other 
personal property shall be awarded to each of the parties as they 
have divided it, except that the rosewood hutch shall be 
delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff, and the desk and 
credenza should be delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant. 
The defendant shall also receive the needlepoint seat which she 
made, but the plaintiff will be entitled to retain the rocker. 
The defendant shall receive the walnut frames. The roll-top desk 
shall be sold immediately and the proceeds from the sale divided 
equally between the parties. Duplicates shall be made of the 
slides and photographs in possession of each of the parties, and 
each of them are ordered to divide equally the cost of preparing 
the duplicates. 
11. The parties shall share equally in any recovery from 
the Larsen Judgment, and each of them is directed to pay one-half 
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of the attorney's fees incurred for obtaining and/or collecting 
the Judgment. 
12. The defendant shall be awarded Judgment for past due 
child support in the amount of $450.00 through November 30, 1987. 
13. Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and 
attorney's fees which they have incurred in this matter, except 
that the Court finds that the necessity of having two hearings on 
the issue of plaintiff's transfer of title to the Maple Hills 
property was not necessary, and the defendant shall pay $350.00 
for the benefit of plaintiff's attorney's fees. The payment of 
said $350.00 attorney's fees shall be made from the distribution 
of the proceeds of the sale to plaintiff prior to dividing the 
shares between the parties. 
Dated this ' — day of February, 1988. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Wv--'" ATTEST 
H. WXOM HtfOLEY 
Depmy (tor* 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this /0 day of February, 1988: 
Ellen M. Maycock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 S. Main Street #620 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Craig M. Peterson 
Attorney for Defendant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Jyikv^ ihuxU 
CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
•ooOoo-
DOUGLAS C. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
SHANNON DALE STEPHENS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. 880600-CA 
District Court Case No. D86-3421 
ooOoo 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered 
four true and correct copies of APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Ellen 
Maycock, Attorney for Respondent, 136 South Main Street, #620, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, the day and year set forth below. 
DATED this day of February, 1989. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
By: 'Ji&f. #< / Z ^ 
TEl 
33645 
pRAIG/M. PE RSON 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellant 
-1-
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
EIGHTH FLOOR, VALLEY TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY (300 SOUTH) TELEPHONE (801) 531-7090 
ELLEN MAYCOCK SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 TELECOPY (801)359-3954 
March20,1989 [V'> y ^'"q 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Stephens v. Stephens 
Case No. 880600-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
We represent Douglas Stephens, the respondent in the above-entitled appeal. 
Mr. Stephens has decided that he does not wish to contest the relief sought on appeal 
by appellant. Accordingly, he is willing that the above-entitled matter be remanded 
to the district court for modification of the decree of divorce in accordance with the 
relief sought in appellant's brief. Accordingly, we will not be filing a brief on behalf 
of respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Ellen Maycock 
EM:vs 
cc: Douglas Stephens 
Craig M. Peterson, Esq. 
